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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Cass County, Minnesota v.
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians' [hereinafter, Leech Lake], struck
yet another blow against Native American tribal sovereignty by allowing
the State of Minnesota to impose property taxes on lands that are within
the bounds of the Indian reservation and held in fee by the Leech Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians.2 This article attempts to examine the legal
issues involved in this recent decision by detailing the historical devel-
opment of federal Indian Law Jurisprudence. This article will consider
whether one hundred and fifty years of federal Indian legislation have
displaced the doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty as expressed by Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall, or whether they merely provide a means to discard
antiquated and unpopular policies of preferential treatment toward
Native Americans.' Leech Lake exemplifies the bitter tension between
federal, state and tribal power, while possibly providing disturbing
insight into racial and cultural struggle in twentieth century American
society.
This struggle is not new-the tension between tribal sovereignty
and state territorial authority remains as difficult now as it was when
Chief Justice John Marshall first addressed it nearly one hundred and
fifty years ago.4 One important distinction is apparent, however,
1. 118 S. Ct. 1904 (1998).
2. The parcels involved in the appeal were lands purchased by the tribe that were lost during
the allotment era of the late 1800's and early 1900's. The parcels at issue were "allotted" pursuant
to provisions of the Nelson Act and the Dawes Act. See also discussion infra part II.B.
3. See discussion infra part II.A.
4. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823). Chief Justice John Mashall first
attempted to address the dilemma between colonialism and constitutionalism, asking if "the
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because after over two hundred years, the once prevailing notion of tri-
bal sovereignty is now little more than a "backdrop against which the
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."5
The Supreme Court's current position is that the labyrinth of fed-
eral Indian statutes and common law have reduced Chief Justice John
Marshall's moral dilemma to little more than a not-so-persuasive policy
argument.6 Moreover, some commentators suggest that the apparent
lack of adherence to Marshall's foundational principles is related to the
Court's recent lack of "interest" in Indian law cases.7 In either case, one
might conclude that the current situation leaves lower courts without
principled, comprehensible guidance.
One intriguing aspect of recent Indian law decisions is that the
Court's rationale in this area is not only inconsistent with many earlier
decisions, but also contrary to the prevalent ideals and goals of tribal
sovereignty as expressed by recent federal executive and legislative
administrations.8 The Supreme Court's decision in Leech Lake could be
construed as yet another example of the Court's reluctance to reconcile
past injustices with judicial authority.
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the current state of Federal
Indian Law jurisprudence through an examination of Cass County, Min-
nesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians.9 The following is an
illustration of the contemporary issues that faced the Court in Leech
Lake, through an examination of the complex historical background.
Section II focuses on the historical background, illustrating the interac-
tion between the Congress, the Courts, and the Indian tribes. In section
III, the emphasis shifts to an examination of contemporary cases that
frame the specific issues of state taxation and tribal sovereignty. This
leads to an examination of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, ° a case with strikingly similar facts as those
in Leech Lake. Section IV concludes with commentary on how the cur-
rent state of federal Indian law may actually encourage litigation
between states and tribes.
Courts of the conqueror" may recognize protection of their indigenous peoples, or were they
bound by allegiance to their colonial heritage.
5. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
6. See id.
7. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993).
8. See L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenium, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996).
9. 118 S. Ct. 1904 (1998).
10. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution,
Congress is empowered "[t]o regulate commerce . . . with the Indian
tribes."' 1 In addressing the tribes' legal status, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall set forth the foundational principles of Indian sovereignty,
announcing that while the United States can abrogate tribal powers and
rights, it can do so only through legislation. 2 "Accordingly, the Court
has protected reservations as enclaves for Indian self-government,
preventing states from enforcing their laws and taxes, and holding that
even federal laws could not be applied to Indians without Congressional
permission." 3
A. Judicial Foundations
The judicial foundations of federal Indian policy have their roots in
three important opinions written by Chief Justice John Marshall (John-
son v. McIntosh, 4 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,"' and Worchester v.
Georgia16). Johnson v. McIntosh'" involved a dispute over the title of a
parcel of land between two non-Indian parties. The issue was whether
the tribe could convey good title to a party other than the United States
government. One party based his claim on a conveyance from a tribe to
a non-Indian, while the other established that his title traced back to a
later transaction in which the tribe sold the land to the United States,
which then conveyed the land in fee simple. 8 In finding good title in
the party whose title flowed from the United States, the Supreme Court
began to address the tensions between colonization and
constitutionalism. 19
Chief Justice Marshall legitimized the discovery doctrine, explain-
ing that "discovery gave title to the government whose subjects, or by
whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments,
which title may be consummated by possession."" ° Johnson did not
fully address the legitimacy of the application of the discovery doctrine,
however, as Marshall maintained that "[i]t is not for the Courts of this
country to question the validity of [the conqueror's] title, or to sustain
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831).
13. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1578 (1996).
14. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
15. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
16. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 588.
20. Id. at 573.
1998]
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one which is incompatible with it.' '2 1 While the opinion was largely
silent on the issue of tribal sovereignty and colonization, Marshall pro-
claimed that tribal sovereignty would be diminished, but not
destroyed.22
Unlike Johnson, the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia23 involved
tribal sovereignty as the central aspect of the controversy.24 In Cherokee
Nation, the tribe sought injunctive relief against a series of Georgia laws
whose jurisdiction extended onto the reservation. By arguing that the
Georgia legislature acted outside of its authority under United States
Constitutional structure, the Cherokee forced the Court to address the
concept of Indian sovereignty. 6 Chief Justice Marshall held, however,
that the case did not come within the Court's original jurisdiction
because the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state" for the purposes
of Article III's provision of the Court's original jurisdiction. 7 The
importance of this case must not be understated, because Chief Justice
Marshall first addressed the merits of the case before deciding the juris-
dictional aspects.28 Instead of simply deciding that the tribes were not
foreign states, he discussed the role of tribal sovereignty within our con-
stitutional structure. A tribe is a "distinct political society, separated
from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself."29
Chief Justice Marshall then proceeded to limit this sovereignty, describ-
ing the tribes as "domestic dependent nations" whose "relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."3 °
Although insightful, the Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation left
many issues regarding tribal sovereignty unresolved. The following
year, a non-Indian litigant forced the Court to specifically address the
relationship between the tribes and the states in Worcester v. Georgia.3"
Here, the state imprisoned a non-Indian missionary for refusing to com-
ply with a Georgia law that required non-Indians to receive permission
from and swear to an oath of loyalty to the state before entering the
reservation.32 In holding that the Georgia law was repugnant to the
21. Id. at 589.
22. See id. at 574.
23. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
24. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 8.
27. See id. at 16-20.
28. The structure of this opinion, in this respect, resembled that of Chief Justice Marshall's
landmark opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. 30 U.S (5 Pet.) at 16.
30. Id. at 17.
31. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
32. See id.
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exclusive sovereign-to-sovereign relationship between the tribe and the
federal government, Chief Justice Marshall stated that an Indian tribe
forms a
distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of [the state] can have no
force, and which the citizens of [the state] have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the [Indians] themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress.33
Chief Justice Marshall further explained that "[t]he whole intercourse
between the United States and [the tribe], is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States."34
Another important aspect of this case is the standard created by
Chief Justice Marshall for Indian treaty interpretation. As in Cherokee
Nation, Georgia refused to appear in Worcester. It was clear to the
Court, however, that an argument could have been made that the Chero-
kee Nation had ceded their sovereignty by treaty.3 In addressing this
point, Chief Justice Marshall set forth several presumptions regarding
Indian treaty interpretation: (1) any terms used in the treaty are read in
relation to how the Indian parties to the treaty would have understood
them at the time of the treaty's creation;36 (2) unless expressly ceded,
tribes reserved their sovereignty, because Indian treaties were reserva-
tions by the tribe of all rights not clearly granted to the United States; 37
and (3) in determining whether tribal sovereignty was expressly ceded,
the "spirit" or purpose of the Indian treaties in general may override the
plain meaning of the terms.38
While Worcester clearly upheld tribal sovereignty, one must recog-
nize that Chief Justice Marshall was indeed consistent with his national-
ist agenda. 39  Both Cherokee Nation and Worcester recognized the
federal government's exclusive authority over the tribal nations at the
33. Id. at 561.
34. Id. at 561.
35. See id. at 551-56.
36. In this respect, Chief Justice Marshall seemed to view the Indian treaty as a "contract of
adhesion," or an agreement in which the negotiation process was characterized by bargaining
between unequal adversaries. For this reason, the more powerful party bore full responsibility for
all contractual drafting and ensuring that the less powerful party understood the terms. See
Frickey, supra note 7, at 401.
37. It is important to note the distinction that Chief Justice Marshall drew. Instead of
regarding the treaty as a cession of all tribal rights to the United States government, which then
granted back certain concessions, Marshall subtly described what was later termed as the
"reserved rights doctrine."
38. See Frickey, supra note 7, at 403. "Indian treaties, according to this construct, are
premised on the continuing nature of tribal sovereignty-they are ongoing arrangements between
sovereigns."
39. See generally, Frickey, supra note 7.
1998]
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states' expense. Within this foundation, Congress had plenary power
over Indian affairs, the executive branch could utilize its treaty power to
regulate Indian affairs, while the federal courts would have jurisdiction
to review and interpret the numerous legislative acts and treaties.4 °
The Worcester declaration that reservation boundaries served as
barriers to state jurisdiction was, however, not without exception. In
1881, a case rose to the Supreme Court because it involved a very diffi-
cult jurisdictional issue. In United States v. McBratney, the Court recog-
nized state jurisdiction over a murder case involving two non-Indians,
where the murder occurred on the Indian reservation. 4' Through this
maneuver the Court denied the effect of federal legislation that appeared
to give the United States district court jurisdiction to try all murder cases
arising on Indian reservations.42 The scope of this exception proved
rather narrow, as later cases demonstrate that the exception may only
include "crimes between whites and whites which do not affect
Indians. 43
A discussion of Federal Indian law can only begin with an exami-
nation of its early judicial history. The following sections illustrate the
importance of executive and legislative actions throughout the early
stages of the development of contemporary Federal Indian law.
Throughout the historical periods now known as the "Removal" period
and the "Assimilation" period," a series of legislative enactments and
treaties demonstrated our nation's difficulty in confronting the remain-
ing dichotomy between colonialism and constitutionalism.
B. Shifting Legislative and Executive Goals
Federal Indian legislation began with the passage of the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790.45 The Act provided for the following: (1) pro-
hibition of trade with tribes unless pursuant to a federal license; (2) pre-
clusion of the sale of land by tribes or tribal members except by lawful
federal treaty; and (3) authorization of federal prosecution for crimes
committed by non-Indians against Indians on Indian lands.46 In 1793,
this act was replaced by a more detailed statute that also included further
40. Id.
41. 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). Accord Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
42. Id. at 624.
43. New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946).
44. The assimilation period reflected the then-prevalent attitudes and goals of Indian
assimilation into "civilized" society. Policymakers relied on theories that the Indians would
benefit from citizenship, Christianity, and popular culture. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6-9 (1995).
45. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137-138.
46. Id.
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provisions to regulate commerce between Indians and non-Indians.47
Subsequent Trade and Commerce Acts enacted throughout the 1880's
expressed a recurring theme-Congressional exercise of plenary control
over Indian affairs.48
Prior to the late nineteenth century, Federal Indian treaties and leg-
islation carried out a "removal" policy whose primary goal was to sepa-
rate the tribes from the citizens and remove them to unsettled territory. 49
This policy shifted by the end of the Civil War, however, to a "reserva-
tion" policy that sought to isolate tribes into aboriginal pockets of land.50
The purposes of the reservation policy were similar to that of the
former removal policy-the separation of the tribes from the citizens."
The reservations were supposedly created to preserve the tribes from
destruction while teaching the tribes the virtues of agriculture and
civilization.52
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, Congress adopted
an "assimilation" policy, carried out through land "allotments," in an
attempt to break up the reservations previously established by treaty.
Assimilation was seen as the next logical step in what was to be the
"civilization" and ultimate intregation of the tribes into larger society.53
Allotment legislation and executive actions were designed to grant
parcels or "allotments" of land to individual tribal members and open
the often sizable remainder of reservation land to settlement by non-
Indians.54 Through its enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887
[hereinafter Dawes Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C.), Congress authorized the breakup of the reservations. 5 Until
the Dawes Act, allotment of reservation or other lands to tribal members
could only be accomplished by treaty. 6 The passage of the Dawes Act
47. Act of March 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329.
48. Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 1, 1 Stat. 469. This Act superseded provisions defining
the Indian country set forth in the 1793 Act by allowing the territory to be modified by treaty. Of
the variations enacted throughout the 1880's, the Act of June 30, 1834, Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, was
the culmination of prior efforts to establish boundaries, redress, and federal criminal jurisdiction in
tribal lands, except as between two Indian parties.
49. Royster, supra note 44, at 1, 7.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REv. 283
(1997).
55. The Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, which enacted §§ 331 to 334,
339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, and 381 of this title, is popularly known as the Indian General
Allotment Act or Dawes Act.
56. See id.
19981
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thus formally marked the beginning of the Assimilation period.57 The
practical realization of the theory was that opening tribal lands to non-
Indians would increase interaction between Indians and non-Indians,
thereby encouraging Indians to assimilate into the broader American
society. 58  The overall effect, however, was to drastically reduce the
amount of land under Indian control and strike a permanent blow against
tribal autonomy.59
Under the Dawes Act, parcels of land to be granted to individual
Indians were held in trust by the federal government for a period of
twenty-five years.6" During that time the Indian allottee was expected to
assimilate to the then accepted principles of agriculture, Christianity,
and citizenship.6' After the trust period concluded, the Act caused the
allotted land to be conveyed to the Indian allottee in fee simple, with all
restrictions and encumbrances against alienation removed.62
Section 331 of the Dawes Act 63 authorized the President to "cause
allotment" of reservation land to individual Indians who met the statu-
tory criteria and specifically described the amount of each type of land
to be allotted.' Section 348 outlined the process of allotment, the legal
status of the allotted lands, and the restrictions on alienability.65
57. The goal of the assimilation theory was that if the reservations were forcibly broken up,
the Indians would eventually assimilate into the modem society, and cease the ward-guardian
relationship. The States also endorsed this concept as it would mean the termination of tribal
sovereignty within their borders.
58. Royster, supra note 44, at 9.
59. By the end of the allotment era, one-third of the land allotted-approximately 27 million
acres-had passed into non-Indian ownership. Additionally, some 60 million acres were lost
under the surplus land acts. Id. at 13.
60. General Allotment Act, supra note 55 at § 5, 24 Stat. 389 (1887); codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 348 (1983).
61. Royster, supra note 44, at 9.
62. Id.
63. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, supra note 55.
64. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1983), provides in part:
In all cases where any tribe or band of Indians has been or shall be located
upon any reservation created for their use by treaty stipulation, Act of Congress, or
executive order, the President shall be authorized to cause the same or any part
thereof to be surveyed or resurveyed whenever in his opinion such reservation or
any part may be advantageously utilized for agricultural or grazing purposes by such
Indians, and to cause allotment to each Indian located thereon to be made in such
areas as in his opinion may be for their best interest not to exceed eighty acres of
agricultural or one hundred and sixty acres of grazing land to any one Indian.
65. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1983), provides in part:
Upon the approval of the allotments provided for in this act by the Secretary of
the Interior, he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees,
which patents shall be of the legal effect, and declare that the United States does and
will hold the land thus allotted, for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the
sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or,
in the case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws of the State or Territory
1998] STARE IN-DECISIS
While the process of allotment began pursuant to provisions of the
Dawes Act, Congress felt that further legislation was required to accom-
plish their assimilation goals.6 6 By enacting the Burke Act of 1906,
Congress amended the Dawes Act to authorize the issuance of fee pat-
ents prior to the previously established twenty-five year period.67
The Burke Act, U.S.C. Section 349, entitled "Patents in fee to allot-
tees," authorized the Secretary of the Interior to reduce the twenty-five
year trust period established in section 348 "whenever he shall be satis-
fied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable of managing his or
her affairs." 68 Patents in fee simple issued pursuant to this discretionary
power expressly provided that "all restrictions as to sale, encumbrance,
or taxation shall be removed."'69  Both provisions unfortunately left
unresolved, however, the issue of whether lands allotted after the
twenty-five year period established under section 348 were also subject
state taxation. 70
Another important amendment to the Dawes Act specifically
addressed the Minnesota tribes. The Nelson Act of January 14, 1889
[hereafter "Nelson Act"], provided specifically for several methods to
effectuate the removal of land from tribal ownership.7 Section 3 of the
where such land is located, and that at the expiration of said period the United States
will convey the same by patent to said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee,
discharged of said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever.
66. Royster, supra note 44, at 16.
67. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182-83 (amending § 6 of General Allotment Act) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 349).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1983).
Patents in fee to allottees.
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to
the Indians by patent in fee, as provided in section 348 of this title, then each and
every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and
criminal, of the State or Territory in which they reside; and no Territory shall pass
or enforce any law denying any such Indian within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law: Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his
discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian
allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her own affairs at any time
cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all
restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said law shall be removed and
said land shall not be liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
issuing of such patent: Provided further, That until the issuance of fee-simple
patents all allottees to whom trust patents shall be issued shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States: And provided further, That the
provisions of this Act shall not extend to any Indians in the former Indian Territory.
69. Id.
70. Until 1992, when the Supreme Court in Yakima v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), held that parcels allotted pursuant to the Burke Act
amendment to the Dawes Act where subject to State ad valorem taxation. See discussion infra at
III.C.
71. The Nelson Act of January 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642 (1889).
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Nelson Act allotted land to individual Indians by incorporating the pro-
cedures of the Dawes Act of 1887.72 Unique procedures in sections 4
and 5 of the Nelson Act authorized the sale of land to non-Indians as
"pine lands."7 3 Section 6 allowed further conveyance of tribal lands to
non-Indians under general homestead laws.74
The passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934 signalled a
dramatic shift away from the Assimilationist policies of the Allotment
era.75  In effect, Congress froze the allotment program and provided
some interim relief by extending trust periods. Section 461 of the Act
stopped any further allotments,76 while section 462 continued any
existing periods of trust indefinitely, or as directed by Congress.77
Further, Congress provided a method for tribes to return parcels of
land to the tax-exempt trust status in section 465.78 This section allowed
the Secretary of the Interior, at his discretion, to acquire property for the
purpose of providing land for the Indian tribes. Under this section, this
land was explicitly exempt from state and local taxation. In practice,
72. Under section 3 of the Nelson Act,
all of said Chippewa Indians in the State of Minnesota, except those on the Red
Lake Reservation, shall, under the direction of the said commissioners, be removed
to and take up their residence on the White Earth Reservation, and thereupon there
shall, as soon as practicable, under the direction of said commissioners, be allotted
lands in severalty to the Red Lake Indians on Red Lake Reservation, and to all the
other of said Indians on White Earth Reservation, in conformity with the act of
February eighth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, entitled "An act for the
allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the various reservations, and to extend
the protection of the laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians,
and for other purposes"; and all allotments heretofore made to any of said Indians
on the White Earth Reservation are hereby ratified and confirmed with the like
tenure and condition prescribed for all allotments under this act: Provided,
however, That the amount heretofore allotted to any Indian on White Earth
Reservation shall be deducted from the amount of allotment to which he or she is
entitled under this act: Provided further, That any of the Indians residing on any of
said reservations may, in his discretion, take his allotment in severalty under this act
on the reservation where he lives at the time of the removal herein provided for is
effected, instead of being removed to and taking such allotment on White Earth
Reservation.
73. Id. at §§ 4-5.
74. Id. at § 6.
75. Act of June 18, 1934, c. 576, 48 Stat. 984, which enacted §§ 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466
to 470, 471 to 473, 474, 475, 476 to 478, and 479 of this title, is popularly known as the Indian
Reorganization Act.
76. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1983). "Allotment of land on Indian reservations.
On and after June 18, 1834, no land of any Indian reservation, created or set apart by treaty or
agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be
allotted in severalty to any Indian."
77. 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1983). "Existing periods of trust and restrictions on alienation extended.
The existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction on alienation
thereof are hereby extended and continued until otherwise directed by Congress."
78. 25 U.S.C § 465 (1983).
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however, this provision has done little to reverse the devastating effects
that the Allotment acts had on Indian land ownership and tribal
autonomy.
What Congress failed to do, however, was to restore fee patented or
homesteaded lands to tribal ownership. Consequently, difficult issues
remained to be resolved by the courts, because although the assimila-
tionist intentions of the allotment legislation were abandoned, the stat-
utes themselves were not formally repealed. Unfortunately, subsequent
judicial decisions have demonstrated the courts' reluctance to abandon
"assimilation" goals despite explicit congressional rejection of the Allot-
ment legacy.79
III. THE MODERN ERA
This section is designed to demonstrate the direction of the
Supreme Court following the Allotment era. Many scholars describe
this era as one of "judicial subjectivism" as the Court is "arguably pursu-
ing its own notion of what is desirable instead of being disciplined by
established tests and rules."8 0 While many contemporary cases illustrate
the Supreme Court's attempt to apply foundational principles to contem-
porary issues, others, such as Leech Lake, illustrate an abandonment of
historical notions of tribal sovereignty.
A. Federal Pre-emption Origins in Indian Law
The Supreme Court's 1959 decision in Williams v. Lee"1 ushered in
the modem era of federal Indian law by vindicating tribal sovereignty in
a modem context. Williams involved a non-Indian merchant seeking
debt-collection against tribal members.82 In holding that tribal authori-
ties had jurisdiction instead of Arizona state courts, the Court not only
affirmed tribal sovereignty, but confirmed its own adherence to founda-
tional principles. The Court succinctly stated "[e]ssentially, absent gov-
eming Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."8 3
Consistent with, and reaffirming Williams, McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission84 remains the definitive modem era case because
it expressed the foundational principles in modem terms. Here, the
79. Royster, supra note 44, at 63-76.
80. Getches, supra note 13, at 1594.
81. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
82. Id. at 220.
83. Id. at 220.
84. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
1998]
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Court held that the State of Arizona could not impose an income tax on a
Navajo who lived on the reservation and whose income was wholly
earned from reservation sources." By defining Indian jurisdiction cases
with a "reliance on federal pre-emption," McClanahan was the first
Indian case to incorporate the modern "pre-emption" concept for the
previous "repugnant" standard utilized by Chief Justice John Marshall in
Worcester.86
In McClanahan, Justice Thurgood Marshall specifically addressed
the issue of state taxation of Indians and held that "Indians and Indian
property on an Indian reservation are not subject to State taxation except
by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act of
Congress."87
In contrast, tribal sovereignty was not presumed in the 1978 case of
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,88 where two non-Indian residents
of an Indian reservation faced criminal charges in an Indian court. Both
petitioners applied for writs of habeas corpus to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington, arguing that the tribal
court did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.89
Justice Rehnquist, delivering the Court's opinion, held that Indian
tribal courts "do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent
affirmative delegation of such power by Congress."9 Rehnquist justi-
fied this decision, in part, by stating that "[u]pon incorporation into the
territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate
power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this over-
riding sovereignty."'
Three years later, the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States,92
held that the tribe's "inherent sovereignty" does not support its regula-
tion of non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within the
reservation.93 The Court illustrated the scope of tribal power, stating
that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
85. Id. at 165.
86. There the Court held that the application of a Georgia law to control the presence of non-
Indian missionaries on the Indian reservation was "repugnant" to treaties and federal laws
preserving tribal sovereignty. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 562.
87. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171 (citing U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845
(1958).
88. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
89. Id. at 194.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id. at 209.
92. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
93. Id. at 563.
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the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation. 94 Thus, the Court in Montana expressly
rejected the presumption of tribal sovereignty demonstrated in earlier
cases.
The Supreme Court again considered jurisdictional boundaries in
Hagen v. Utah,95 a case that examined the legal effects of Allotment
legislation on the scope of "Indian Country."96 The petitioner was
charged in a Utah court with distribution of a controlled substance. The
offense occurred, however, in a town that was established within the
original boundaries of an Indian reservation. For this reason, petitioner
argued that the Utah courts lacked jurisdiction.97 Citing numerous allot-
ment and surplus land acts, Justice O'Connor concluded that Congress
had intended that the reservation be diminished, thereby geographically
diminishing tribal sovereignty. 98
B. Taxation Cases
State taxation cases demonstrate the complexity of interpreting the
statutory skeleton left after the Allotment era. The following cases illus-
trate various issues that arise when states attempt to tax Indian property.
As in Leech Lake, the federal courts are forced to determine what
aspects of Indian sovereignty still remain after the passage of conflicting
federal Indian legislation over two distinct eras. The difficulty arises
because although the assimilationist goals of the Allotment era were
explicitly rejected with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, the
allotment acts themselves were never formally repealed. This allows
state and local governments to cite the allotment acts as a demonstration
of congressional intent to tax Indians, their lands, and their livelihoods.
The following cases illustrate the complex interaction between the
Allotment and Reorganization statutes when attempting to surmise the
intent of Congress. These cases frame the issues and provide the back-
drop for the Supreme Court's Leech Lake decision.
In the 1906 case of Goudy v. Meath,9 9 the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment by the Supreme Court of the State of Wash-
94. Id. at 564.
95. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
96. Id. at 401-02.
97. Id. at 408.
98. Id. at 410-17. Justice O'Connor concluded by stating that the "jurisdictional history, as
well as the current population situation . . . demonstrates a practical acknowledgment that the
Reservation was diminished; a contrary conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable
expectations of the people living in the area" Id. at 421. Thus, Justice O'Connor provides another
factor in weighing tribal sovereignty-the expectations of the local residents.
99. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
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ington, denying the claim of an Indian allottee to exemption from state
taxation. The United States Supreme Court held that, "Indians to whom
allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be subject to the
laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may
reside,"'" and that "it is disregarding [the Dawes Act] to hold that the
Indian, having property, is not subject to taxation when he is subject to
all the laws, civil and criminal, of the State."' '
The simplicity of this reasoning was not followed, however, in the
1912 case of Choate v. Trapp.10 2 Here, the state of Oklahoma attempted
to tax Indian allotments before the end of the Dawes Act's statutory trust
period.'03 Unlike Goudy, the Court discussed the applicable statutes in
detail before concluding that "[tax] exemption and nonalienability were
two separate and distinct subjects," thus rejecting Oklahoma's
argument. Io4
Another important aspect of Choate is that it embraced Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's canons of treaty construction and reaffirmed their appli-
cation to Federal Indian legislation. The Choate Court stated that, "[t]he
construction, instead of being strict, is liberal; doubtful expressions,
instead of being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved
in favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation,
and dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith."' ' The Court
then acknowledged the history of the rule, stating that, "[t]his rule of
construction has been recognized, without exception, for more than a
hundred years, and has been applied to tax cases.' 0 6
Later, in 1956, the Court in Squire v. Capoeman °7 examined the
effect of the Burke Act amendment to the Dawes Act. The defendants in
Squire contended that the proceeds from the sale of timber on their allot-
ted land should not be subject to federal income taxation because such
taxation would be in violation of the Dawes Act.10 8 In this case, the
United States had issued a trust patent to Capoeman pursuant to the
Dawes Act, but no patent in fee had been issued. 0 9 Interpreting the
Burke Act amendment, the Court concluded that "[tihe literal language
of the [Burke Act] evinces a congressional intent to subject an Indian
allotment to all taxes only after a patent in fee is issued to the allot-
100. Id. at 149.
101. Id. at 150.
102. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
103. Id. at 667.
104. Id. at 673.
105. Id. at 675.
106. Id. at 675.
107. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. at 3-4.
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tee."' 1  In holding the tax invalid, the Court stated that, "until such time
as the patent is issued, the allotment shall be free from all taxes, both
those in being and those which might in the future be enacted.""' The
Court thus rejected any construction of the Burke Act to include even
federal taxation of allotment parcels, except as expressly authorized in
the provisions.'
As previously discussed, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission13 is important to the taxation line of cases as it established the
federal pre-emption of Arizona's personal income tax on an individual
Indian's reservation income. 14 Addressing the effect of state taxation
on tribal sovereignty, the Court held that, "by imposing the tax in ques-
tion on this appellant, the State has interfered with matters which the
relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal
Government and to the Indians themselves."' 1 5
McClanahan also indicates a shift from the earlier cases that had
relied heavily on notions of tribal sovereignty. The Court explained, the
"Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must
be read."' 16
In the Supreme Court's very next case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones,1 17 the State of New Mexico asserted its authority to impose a
sales tax on an Indian-operated ski resort and a use tax on certain materi-
als purchased out-of-state and used in connection with the ski resort. 118
The resort itself was not located within the existing boundaries of the
reservation, but rather on land adjacent to the reservation and leased to
the tribe from the United States Forest Service." 9
The Mescalero Tribe argued that land developed pursuant to the
Indian Reorganization Act constituted a federal instrumentality, and was
thereby not subject state taxation. 20 In response, the Court cautioned
that there is "no statutory invitation to consider projects undertaken pur-
suant to the [Indian Reorganization] Act as federal instrumentalities gen-
110. Id. at 7-8.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 10.
113. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
114. See Id.
115. Id. at 165.
116. Id. at 172.
117. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
118. Id. at 146.
119. Id. at 146. The property at issue was developed under the auspices of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.
120. Id. at 150.
1998l
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
erally and automatically immune from state taxation." 121 Justice White,
in the majority opinion did acknowledge, however, that the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934 "reflected a new policy of the Federal Govern-
ment and aimed to put a halt to the loss of tribal lands through
allotment." 
22
Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes 2 3 represents the first of several
Indian "smoke shop" cigarette tax cases.' 24 Deputy sheriffs arrested a
tribal member for failure to possess a state cigarette dealer's license and
for selling non-tax-stamped cigarettes. The Tribe subsequently sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court against the State's
cigarette tax and vendor-licensing statutes as applied to tribal members
who sold cigarettes within the reservation. 125 The Supreme Court also
reviewed a later action where the Tribe challenged the portion of Mon-
tana's statutory scheme that imposed a personal property tax on motor
vehicles owned by tribal members residing on the reservation.
126
The Moe Court first cited Mescalero v. Jones12 7 for the proposition
that "absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,
there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation
lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries
of the reservation," and that "such taxation is not permissible absent
congressional intent."'' 28 The Court then rejected Montana's distinction
between states' jurisdiction over land held in fee by individual Indians
and that of tribal trust land. By concluding that "such an impractical
pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction [within the reservation] was con-
trary to the intent embodied in the existing federal statutory law of
Indian jurisdiction," the Court illustrated that factors such as practicality
in enforcement are important. 2
9
In conclusion, the Court held that "the personal property tax on
personal property located within the reservation; the vendor license fee
121. Id. at 151.
122. Id. at 15 1. This recognition has not been embraced, however, by other members of the
Supreme Court. Cf. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Hagen v. Utah, supra, section III.C.
123. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
124. Realizing the competitive advantage of retail cigarette sales that are immune from state
taxation ("smoke shops"), many Indian tribes began to put up smoke shops on reservation borders
to draw non-Indian smokers looking for bargain cigarette prices. These shops infringed on the
states' ability to maximize revenue from the sale of cigarettes, so the states sought various means
to tax the smoke shops. Legal disputes ensued that further delineated the states' authority to tax
the tribes.
125. Id. at 467-68.
126. Id. at 468-69.
127. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
128. Id. at 475-76 (citing Mescalero v. Jones, 411 U.S. at 148 (1973)).
129. Id. at 478. For an example of the opposite conclusion, see Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), infra.
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[as applied]; and the cigarette sales tax, as applied to on-reservation
sales by Indians to Indians, conflict with the congressional statutes
which provide the basis for decisions with respect to such
impositions." 130
In 1972, Russell Bryan, a Chippewa of the Leech Lake Indian Res-
ervation brought a suit in the Minnesota District Court seeking a declar-
atory judgment that the State and County were without authority to levy
a personal property tax on his mobile home (in which he resided on the
reservation), and that imposition of such a tax was contrary to federal
law.131 The Minnesota District Court rejected his contention, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment for the
County. 132
Bryan v. Itasca County13 3 thus presented a question reserved in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission:34 "whether the grant of
civil jurisdiction to the States conferred by section 4 of Pub. L. 280, 67
Stat. 589, 28 U.S.C. s 1360, is a congressional grant of power to the
States to tax reservation Indians except insofar as taxation is expressly
excluded by the terms of the statute."1 35
Section 1360 of the United States Code, entitled "State civil juris-
diction in actions to which Indians are parties," granted jurisdiction to
each of the states listed in the statute. Under the law, state courts have
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indi-
ans are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country. Jurisdiction
over these matters exists to the same extent that the State has jurisdiction
over other causes of action.1 36 Section 1360 did include, however, a
limiting clause that excluded state jurisdiction over real or personal
property held in trust by the United States or subject to restrictions from
the same.1 37
130. The Court here did not hold, however, that the smoke shops could necessarily sell nontax-
stamped cigarettes to non-Indians. Id. at 480-81.
131. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. 411 U.S. 164, 178 (1973).
135. Id. at 375.
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1993). Paragraph (a), in pertinent part reads:
Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent that
such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of
such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1993). Paragraph (b), in pertinent part reads:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of
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Applying section 1360 to the facts of the case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that "[u]nless paragraph (a) is interpreted as a
general grant of the power to tax, then the exceptions contained in para-
graph (b) are limitations on a nonexistent power."'138 Overruling the
Minnesota Supreme Court's construction, Justice Brennan held that con-
clusion foreclosed "by the legislative history of [section 1360] and the
application of canons of construction applicable to congressional statutes
claimed to terminate Indian immunities."'' 39 After an extensive discus-
sion of the legislative history of section 1360, the Court concluded that
"the primary intent of [paragraph (a)] was to grant jurisdiction over pri-
vate civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court"' 4° and
that section 1360, "was plainly not meant to effect total assimilation."''
The Court concluded by restating that the termination of traditional
Indian immunity from taxation "must be expressed on the face of the
Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative
history." 42
Issues left unresolved by the Court in the smoke shop case of Moe
v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes4 3 resurfaced in Washington v. Confeder-
ated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation.'44 In Confederated Tribes,
tribes from the Makah and Lummi Indian Reservations sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the state sales and ciga-
rette taxes. In particular, plaintiffs sought to avoid the effects of the
state's seizure of nontax-stamped cigarettes destined for delivery to the
reservations. 45 The tribes also challenged the State's imposition of
motor vehicle excise taxes on Indian-owned vehicles. 4 6 Seeking to
avoid the conclusion of Moe, the state statute in this case sought only to
tax cigarette sales to non-Indians. 47 Furthermore, the motor vehicle
any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or
Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall
authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;
or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or
otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest
therein.
138. 228 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 1975).
139. 426 U.S. at 379.
140. Id. at 385.
141. Id. at 387.
142. Id. at 393 (citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973)).
143. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
144. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
145. See id. at 139.
146. See id. at 139-40.
147. See Section 82.24.260, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-192 (1977).
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excise tax was premised on the use of such vehicles "in the state"1 48 to
avoid the application of Bryan v. Itasca.'49
The Tribes also distinguished their position from that of the posi-
tions of plaintiffs in earlier cases, as they had enacted ordinances
approved by the Secretary of the Interior to tax and regulate cigarette
sales. 150 The Tribes argued that the State's imposition of a sales tax on
cigarettes would thus preclude them from imposing their own tax, and
hence, disturb their right of self-governance.' 5 '
Addressing the Tribes' argument that they had pre-empted Wash-
ington from imposing cigarette taxes, the Court explained:
Although the Tribes themselves could perhaps pre-empt state taxation
through the exercise of properly delegated federal power to do so....
we do not infer from the mere fact of federal approval of the Indian
taxing ordinances, or from the fact that the Tribes exercise congres-
sionally sanctioned powers of self-government, that Congress has
delegated the far-reaching authority to pre-empt valid state sales and
cigarette taxes otherwise collectible from nonmembers of the
Tribe." ' 52
Upon balancing the State's interest in taxation with that of the
Tribe, the Court concluded that the state's interests were significantly
greater because the disputed taxes applied to non-members of the reser-
vation. 53 The Court was aware that the result of this decision would be
to lessen or eliminate tribal commerce with nonmembers, but reasoned
that the cigarette market existed only because of the tax exemption. 5 4
Additionally, the Court was content with the state's imposition of "at
least minimal burdens on Indian businesses to aid in collecting and
enforcing [the] tax." '55 Finally, the Court held that Washington may
seize unstamped cigarettes as contraband if the Tribes do not cooperate
in collecting the state's taxes. However, the Court required that these
seizures take place outside of the reservation, so as not to "unnecessarily
intrud[e] on core tribal interests."' 56
The Court did decide the issue of the motor vehicle tax in favor of
the Tribes. It held, that although Washington may impose a tax solely
on the "use" of motor vehicles on state roads, the statute at issue was not
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.44.020 (Supp. 1977).
149. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
150. 447 U.S. at 144.
151. Id. at 154.
152. Id. at 156.
153. See id. at 157.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 159.
156. Id at 161-62. It is rather ironic that the Court includes this last regard to tribal interests
after completely divesting the tribes of their very profitable smoke shop business.
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so constructed. '57
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined in a dissenting
opinion, argued that Washington's taxing scheme should be invalidated
for two reasons. First, Justice Brennan argued that while they did not
partake in full territorial sovereignty, the Tribes' sovereign authority to
self-governance was undermined by Washington's taxing scheme.
Additionally, Justice Brennan argued that Washington's scheme con-
flicted with tribal activities and functions that had been expressly
approved by the federal government.' 58 This dissent further referred to
the Indian Reorganization Act to support the proposition that the "inter-
est in stimulating Indian economic and commercial development" is one
of "central importance in analyzing any conflict of state and tribal
law."' 59 The dissent thus argued more traditional doctrines of tribal sov-
ereignty along with contemporary goals of promoting tribal
development.
In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's
use of a balancing test between tribal and state interests to tax.1 60 He
stated, "I see no need for this Court to balance the state and tribal inter-
ests in enacting particular forms of taxation in order to determine their
validity. . . . Either Congress intended to pre-empt the state taxing
authority or it did not."' 6' Concurring with the Court's decision on this
issue, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress had not pre-empted
state authority to impose the cigarette tax, but he cautioned that the
"[b]alancing of interest is not the appropriate gauge for determining
validity since it is that very balancing which we have reserved to Con-
gress."' 62 Finally, Rehnquist emphasized that the issue in this case is
not merely Indian sovereignty, but State sovereignty as well. 16 3
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico'64 is particularly interesting
because the suit was initiated by a non-Indian party. Cotton Petroleum
Corporation ("Cotton") leased reservation land from the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe for the purpose of extracting gas and oil. Until 1982, Cotton paid
the Tribe and the state of New Mexico a severance tax for all gas and oil
extracted from the Indian lands.1 65 In 1982, Cotton paid its state taxes
157. Id. at 163-64.
158. Id. at 165.
159. Id. at 166-9.
160. Justice Rehnquist concurred with the result, except regarding the motor vehicle tax. He
would remand this issue to determine the application and effect of this tax. Justice Rehnquist
further disagreed with much of the Court's reasoning with regard to the cigarette tax. See id.
161. Id. at 177.
162. Id. at 177.
163. See id. at 181.
164. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
165. See id. at 169-70.
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under protest, but then brought an action in the District Court for Santa
Fe County, contending that the "taxes imposed on reservation activity
are only valid if related to actual expenditures by the State in relation to
the activity being taxed."' 66 The Court rejected this argument and cited
common law doctrines to demonstrate that the tax-benefit relationship
was not necessary in this situation.'
67
Addressing another perspective, the Court stated that current doc-
trine allowed a state to impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties
that engaged in business transactions with the United States or an Indian
tribe even if the financial burden of the tax fell on the United States or
the tribe. 168 To determine whether the state tax was pre-empted by fed-
eral legislation, however, the Court examined congressional intent and
the history of tribal sovereignty.1 69 Siding with New Mexico, the Court
held that the State and the Tribe had concurrent jurisdiction over the
same territory. 170
Cotton Petroleum is primarily important to this discussion because
it illustrates the Court's reluctance to invalidate a state tax where such a
tax does not directly infringe on notions of tribal autonomy. This is a
proposition that the dissent in Cotton Petroleum did not accept. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that the degree to which
state taxation adversely affects the tribe is not truly important, as the pre-
emption threshold is minimal.
1 7
'
The issue presented in the three consolidated cases that constitute
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation'72 is whether the Yakima Indian Nation or the County of
Yakima, a governmental unit of the state of Washington, had the author-
ity to zone fee lands owned by nonmembers of the Tribe located within
the boundaries of the Yakima Reservation. The 1989 boundaries of the
Yakima Indian reservation were created in a treaty signed in 1855 in
which the Yakima Nation ceded vast areas of land to the United States.
The treaty reserved an area, the Yakima Indian Reservation, for its
"exclusive use and benefit."1 73 The Yakima Nation sought declaratory
166. Id. at 170.
167. See id. at 189-190.
168. See id. at 175.
169. See id. at 176.
170. The Court flatly rejected the "multiple taxation" argument, demonstrating a difference
between an Indian tribe and a State as a matter of constitutional law. See id. at 192.
171. See id. at 210-11.
172. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
173. The treaty further provided that no "white man, excepting those in the employment of the
Indian Department, [shall] be permitted to reside upon the said reservation without permission of
the tribe and the superintendent and agent." Treaty between the United States and the Yakima
Nation of Indians (Treaty with the Yakimas), June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, 952.
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judgment that they had exclusive authority to zone the properties at issue
and an injunction barring any action or approval of any action on the
land that was inconsistent with the Yakima Nation zoning ordinances. 17 4
While limited in its utility, Brendale sheds some light on the con-
temporary interpretation of allotment era legislation. The Yakima
Nation first argued that by the terms of the treaty, the power to exclude
necessarily carries with it the authority over the land at issue. The Court
quickly rejected this argument, explaining that the effect of the Allot-
ment Acts was to abrogate treaty rights in light of subsequent alienation
of allotted lands.' 75 In addressing the impact of the legislative repeal of
the Allotment Acts, the Court stated that, "[a]lthough the Indian Reor-
ganization Act may have ended the allotment of further lands, it did not
restore to the Indians the exclusive use of those lands that had already
passed to non-Indians or prevent already allotted lands for which fee
patents were subsequently issued from thereafter passing to non-
Indians." 76
This plurality opinion resulted in an affirmation of the jurisdictional
"checkerboard" with respect to zoning power over reservation fee
land. "'77 The effects that this decision will have on taxation cases
remains to be seen, however.
Brendale also illustrates the tension and disagreement within the
Supreme Court with regard to Indian law during the 1983 Term. The
resulting plurality opinion is a confusing display of tests and balancing
factors, leading Justice Scalia to later comment that "[i]f the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Brendale [pre-emption] test were the law, litigation would surely
engulf the States' annual assessment and taxation process, with the
validity of each levy dependent upon a multiplicity of factors that vary
from year to year, and from parcel to parcel."' 78
174. Petitioner Philip Brendale inherited land that had been allotted to his great aunt. He held
that land in fee. Brendale planned to develop his property into Summer cabins and sought
approval from the Yakima County Planning Department. The proposed development would not
have been permissible under the Yakima Nation zoning ordinance. The county planning
department issued a Declaration of Non-Significance. The Yakima Nation appealed to the
Yakima County Board of Commissioners on the ground that the county had no zoning authority
over the land. See 492 U.S. at 417-19.
A consolidated case involved petitioner Stanley Wilkinson, a non-Indian and nonmember of
the Yakima Nation who owned a 40 acre tract within the reservation. The facts with regard to
Wilkinson's development plans were materially similar to those of petitioner Brendale, stated
above. Id. at 418.
175. See id. at 422-23.
176. Id. at 423.
177. See id. at 422-25.
178. Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
266-8 (1992).
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C. County of Yakima to Leech Lake
The 1992 case of County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands'7 9 is of primary importance to this discussion because its factual
and legal issues are nearly identical to those of Leech Lake. In Yakima,
the Supreme Court held that lands that were transferred pursuant to the
Burke Act proviso of the Dawes Act may be subject to local ad valorem
property taxation. 8 ' The State of Washington had imposed property
taxes on land located within the Yakima Reservation, but patented in
fee, pursuant to the Burke Act amendment of the Dawes Act. 8' The
Yakima Nation also sought declaratory judgment against an excise tax
on sales of such land. 182
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia began with a discussion of
the legislative history applicable to the parcels in dispute. The critical
issue in this case was the construction of the Burke Act as it modified
the Dawes Act, to which Scalia explained, "we agree with the Court of
Appeals that by specifically mentioning immunity from land taxation 'as
one of the restrictions that would be removed upon conveyance in fee,'
Congress in the Burke Act proviso 'manifest[ed] a clear intention to per-
mit the state to tax' such Indian lands."'183
In what appears as posturing for future cases, Justice Scalia indi-
cated that the Dawes Act does not depend on the application of the
Burke Act for state taxing authority. He reasoned that, "the [Burke Act]
proviso reaffirmed for such 'prematurely' patented land what [25 U.S.C.
§ 348] implied with respect to patented land generally: subjection to
state real estate taxes" (emphasis added).184 Scalia concluded by stating,
"[t]he short of the matter is that the General Allotment Act explicitly
authorizes only 'taxation of ... land,' not "taxation with respect to
land," thus invalidating Washington's tax on the sale of land."' 85
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun was extremely critical
of the Court's construction of the Dawes Act, stating that, "I have
wandered the maze of Indian statutes and case law tracing back 100
years. Unlike the Court, however, I am unable to find an 'unmistakably
clear' intent of Congress to allow the States to tax Indian-owned fee-
179. Id.
180. Id. at 270.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 253-54.
183. Id. at 259 (quoting the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 903 F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th
Cir. 1990)). The Burke Act proviso, 25 U.S.C. § 349, is discussed in section lI.B., supra.
184. Id. at 264. See section II.B., supra.
185. Id. at 269.
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patented lands." 8 6
Justice Blackmun sternly criticized the Court's decision and
explained what he perceived as the Court's three errors in arriving at its
finding of an "unmistakably clear" intent to tax the Indian lands:
First, [the Court] divines "unmistakably clear" intent from a proviso,
which by its very terms applies only to land patented prematurely
(and not to all patented land) and which is now orphaned, its antece-
dent principle clause no longer having any force of law. Second,
acting on its own intuition that it would be "strange" for land to be
alienable and encumberable yet not taxable, the Court infers "unmis-
takably clear" intent of Congress from an otherwise irrelevant statu-
tory section that itself makes no mention of taxation of fee lands.
Finally, misapprehending the nature of federal pre-emption of state
laws taxing the Indians, the Court mistakenly assumes that it cannot
give any effect to the many complex intervening statutes reflecting a
complete turnabout in federal Indian policy-now aimed at preserv-
ing tribal integrity and the Indian land base-since enactment at the
turn of the century of the statutory provisions upon which the Court
relies. These current and now longstanding federal policies weigh
decisively against the Court's findings that Congress has intended the
States to tax-and, as in these cases, to foreclose upon-Indian-held
lands. '87
As previously stated, the analysis followed in Yakima is interesting
when compared with that of Leech Lake'88 because of their similar fac-
tual and statutory backgrounds. In both cases, the issue was whether the
state could impose property taxes on land that was within the boundaries
of the reservation and held in fee by individual Indians. Unlike Yakima,
the allotments in Leech Lake were carried out pursuant to the Nelson
Act.' 89 Like Yakima, the effect of Cass County was to so drastically
reduce the amount of land within tribal hands, that by 1977, the Leech
Lake band and tribal members owned less than five percent of the Leech
Lake reservation land.' 9° Since then, the Leech Lake Band has had an
agenda to repurchase lands lost during the allotment era in an effort to
reestablish its cultural and land base.' 9 ' After Yakima, Cass County
began assessing ad valorem taxes on property "reclaimed" by the Leech
Lake Band. To avoid forclosure, the Band paid more than $64,000.00,
in taxes, interest and penalties, to the county under protest. In 1995, the
186. The Justices are in agreement with the "unmistakably clear" standard that Justice
Blackmun indicates here. Id. at 270.
187. Id at 271.
188. 118 U.S. S. Ct. 1904 (1998).
189. See supra note 71.
190. See 118 S.Ct. at 1907.
191. See id.
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Band sought relief in the Federal District Court in the form of a declara-
tory judgment that Cass County could not tax the twenty-one parcels of
land that had been reclaimed.' 9
Both Yakima and Leech Lake required the Court to interpret the
effects of the Indian Reorganization Act on the Dawes Act, and its exec-
utory amendments. 93 The main discernible legal difference, however,
was that Leech Lake compelled the Supreme Court to resolve the spe-
cific question of state taxation of lands that were allotted pursuant to
provisions of the Nelson Act, which only applied to the Minnesota
tribes. This Act conveyed the land of the Leech Lake Band and other
Minnesota Chippewa tribes to its current fee-holders. 194
The statutory-based distinction between these two cases was not
important to the Court in Leech Lake, as Justice Scalia's opinion in
Yakima makes clear that the Dawes Act, by itself, gave states taxing
authority over Indian-held lands.' 95 While Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Yakima sternly cautioned against implying congressional intent into the
old allotment acts (because the legislative intent clearly shifted with the
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934), recent Indian law
cases illustrate the current Court's enthusiasm to fabricate congressional
intent from the thinnest of threads. 196
As previously stated, it is plausible that the Court granted certiorari
to Cass County because of the weak congressional intent arguments in
Yakima. In Leech Lake, the issue of the Leech Lake Band's use of sec-
tion 465 to return parcels back to trust status was used against them.
The Court reasoned, "if we were to accept the Leech Lake Band's argu-
ment, it would render partially superfluous section 465 of the Indian
Reorganization Act.' ' 97 The Court further stated that the Band realized
this as the means to achieve tax-exempt status "because in 1995 it suc-
cessfully applied to the Secretary of the Interior under section 465 to
restore federal trust status" to some of the parcels at issue.' 98 The Court
held that because Congress gave the Indian tribes the ability to regain
trust status through section 465, Congress clearly intended that the par-
cels be subject to ad valorem taxation absent execution of this provision.
This logical solution was so obvious, however, that one must wonder
192. See id. at 1908.
193. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, Minn., 108 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997).
194. See 108 F.3d at 822.
195. 502 U.S. at 269.
196. See id. at 273-74.
197. 118 S. Ct. at 1910.
198. Id. at 1910.
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why the Yakima Court did not espouse it. Does Leech Lake solely serve
the purpose of legitimizing the Yakima decision?
Furthermore, other post-Yakima tax cases, such as Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation 99 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Chickasaw Nation,2 °° further demonstrate this Court's reluctance to fol-
low Chief Justice Marshall's foundational principles or the post-Allot-
ment congressional intent to promote tribal welfare. Recent cases
demonstrate the current trend of considering the states' interests first, at
the expense of tribal sovereignty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice John Marshall set forth the founding principles of fed-
eral Indian law jurisprudence in what is now known as the "Marshall
Trilogy."201 Since this period, federal legislation has taken a more pri-
mary role in Indian affairs, while the courts are faced with interpreting
the increasingly complicated federal Indian statutes. Moreover, recent
cases demonstrate that the courts themselves produce seemingly incon-
sistent decisions that give subsequent district and appellate courts little
guidance in their decision-making.202 In turn, this encourages litigation
between states and tribes embedded in bitter territorial and jurisdictional
disputes. The cases examined thus far illustrate the adversarial positions
taken between the tribes and the states. From cigarette and mobile home
taxes to property taxes, it seems as though the federal courts and legisla-
ture have ensured that the proper forum for any dispute is costly
litigation.
Finally, many of the lower court judges, and even Supreme Court
justices have little interest or enthusiasm for this important body of law,
referring to Indian law cases as "crud,"20 3 "peewee" cases,20 4 and even
"chickenshit cases. 20 5 Other commentators argue, however, that con-
temporary Indian law cases indicate that the Supreme Court is now
199. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
200. 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
201. See section H.A., supra.
202. Justice Scalia's description of Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence:
[O]pinions in this field have not posited an original state of affairs that can
subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation, but have rather sought to
discern what the current state of affairs ought to be by taking into account all
legislation, and the congressional "expectations" that it reflects, down to the present
day.
Getches, supra note 13 at 1575.
203. Frickey, supra note 7, at 382-83.
204. BOB WOODWARD & Sco-rr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETrEREN 58 (1979) (purporting to quote
Justice Harlan).
205. Id. at 359 (purporting to quote Justice Brennan).
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assuming the role it formerly conceded to Congress; considering and
weighing cases that reach results based on the Justices' subjective
notions of what the current Indian jurisdictional boundaries should be.2°6
If the congressional intent in Yakima were so "unmistakably clear," why
would the Supreme Court need to even consider Leech Lake?
Maybe Leech Lake indicates that the Supreme Court felt the need to
provide additional support to its tenuous congressional intent arguments
formulated in Yakima. While the facts of these cases may seem unim-
portant or dull to some, in the heart of every Indian law case lies the
same philosophical challenge that haunted Chief Justice John Mar-
shall-the dilemma of constitutionalism in a colonial society.
JAMES S. WARREN
206. Consider Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Bryan v. Itasca, for the proposition that the
balancing of interests should be done by Congress, not the courts. See 447 U.S. at 168-69.
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